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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Small Claims Actions Statute Requiring Prepayment of Jury Fee and Costs upon
Filing of Demand for Jury Trial Held Constitutional. County
of Portage v. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d 466, 312 N.W.2d 731
(1981).
In Milwaukee County Small Claims Court, 44,882 small
claims actions were flied during 1981.1 The litigants in
roughly twenty of those actions requested jury trials2 and
were required by statute to pay jury fees in advance of trial.
Once the fees were paid, the actions proceeded as if
originated as "large claims," that is, civil actions governed
by Wisconsin statutes on civil procedure which do not require payment of jury fees.4 In 1981 only about three Milwaukee County small claims actually went to jury trial.
Throughout the state of Wisconsin, small claims procedure operates in the same manner. The defendant in one
Portage County small claims action, who requested a jury
trial, questioned why he should advance jury fees merely because he was a party in a small, rather than a large, claim.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court answered in County of Portage v. Steinpreis8 that prepayment of jury fees in small
claims actions is reasonable and constitutional considering
the high cost of operating courts 9 and the need to guarantee
the sincerity of a party's jury demand.' 0 By so ruling, the
court rejected the argument of the court of appeals that
treating small claims litigants differently from large claims
litigants denies them equal protection."
1. Telephone interview with Marvin Kopitzke, Assistant Chief Deputy Clerk,
Milwaukee Circuit Court, Civil Division (July 7, 1982).
2. Id.
3. Wis. STAT. § 799.21(3) (1979).
4. Wis. STAT. § 799.21(4) (1979). Applicable civil procedure statutes are Wis.
STAT. chs. 801-807 (1979).
5. Telephone interview, supra note 1.
6. Wis. STAT. § 799.21(3)-(4) (1979).
7. County of Portage v. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d 466, 468-69, 312 N.W.2d 731, 732
(1981).
8. 104 Wis. 2d 466, 312 N.W.2d 731 (1981).
9. Id. at 477, 312 N.W.2d at 736.
10. Id. at 481, 312 N.W.2d at 738.
11. Id. at 483-84, 312 N.W.2d at 739. The unpublished court of appeals decision
is County of Portage v. Steinpreis, Nos. 80-037, 80-038 (Wis. Ct. App. July 28, 1980)
(available on LEXIS, Wis library, Ct App file).
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This note will highlight the majority's holding and the
dissent's argument inSteinpreis. It will also analyze the decision's possible implications for reform of Wisconsin's small
claims procedure. 12
L THE CASE

Plaintiff Portage County filed two separate small claims
actions 13 against defendant Robert J. Steinpreis to recover
unpaid costs of ambulance services provided by the county. 14
Steinpreis, acting pro se, denied he owed the money and requested a jury trial. 15 The clerk of courts informed him that
he would first have to pay the court forty-three dollars 16 as
required by statute. 17 Steinpreis refused to pay and fied a
motion challenging the constitutionality of the statute. The
trial court denied his motion, and judgment was entered
against him. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, saying the statute denied small claims litigants equal protection "' since no prepayment of jury fees is required in a
regular civil court action. 19 Portage County appealed. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed. 20
While the court of appeals decided the case solely 2' on
12. An in-depth analysis of the constitutional issues raised by the Steinpreis majority, including trial by jury, purchase of justice and equal protection, is beyond the
scope of this note.
13. The two claims were consolidated on appeal. County of Portage v. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d 466, 468 n.1, 312 N.W.2d 731, 731 n.1 (1981).
14. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d at 468-69, 312 N.W.2d at 732.
15. Id.
16. Id. The $43.00 included suit tax, clerk's fee and jury fee. Id. Steinpreis did
not file an affidavit of indigency, pursuant to Wis. STAT. § 814.21(1) (1979), which, if
approved, would have permitted him to avoid paying the clerk's fee and suit tax. The
supreme court let stand the court of appeals decision that this failure to file for indigency status precluded Steinpreis from challenging the suit tax and clerk's fee. Id. at
474, 312 N.W.2d at 734-35. As a result, his challenge and the court's decision relate
only to the prepayment of jury fees.
17. Wis. STAT. § 799.21(3)(c) (1979). The statute provides: "The fee for a jury is
$24, plus an additional amount as suit tax which will result in a suit tax payment of
the amount which would have been payable had the action been commenced under
chs. 801 to 807 and additional clerk's fees of $6." Id.
18. County of Portage v. Steinpreis, Nos. 80-037, 80-038, slip op. at 7 (Wis. Ct.
App. July 28, 1980) (available on LEXIS, Wis library, Ct App file).
19. Id. at 3-5.
20. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d at 484, 312 N.W.2d at 739.
21. Steinpreis, Nos. 80-037, 80-038, slip op. at 2, 7.
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the issue of equal protection, 22 the supreme court also addressed the issues of whether the jury fee violated the right
to trial by jury23 and whether the fee constituted a "purchase
ofjustice. '' 24 Relying on the premise that "[t]he Constitution

does not guarantee to the citizen the right to litigate without
expense.

,,,

5the majority noted that the added costs of a

jury trial should be borne by the litigant who demands that
the court incur these extra expenses.26 The majority said the
court's role when fees are challenged is to determine whether
the fee is a reasonable amount. 27 By ruling that the twentyfour dollar jury fee required of Steinpreis was not excessive
but "insignificant when compared to the actual cost of the
courtroom procedures,

' 28

the court ruled that the fees were

neither a purchase of justice nor a violation of the right to
trial by jury.29 In addition, the court said that imposing the
fees "helps to insure the sincerity of the litigant's jury
demand. 30
The supreme court attacked the equal protection issue by
first addressing the standard for reviewing the validity of
legislative classifications. The court said the test is not
whether the classification results in any inequality, but
whether there is any rational basis for the disparate classification.31 This test requires that a statutory category bear

some rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose.32 Applying the test to the Steinpreis case, the majority
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Wis. CONST. art. I,
23. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 5.

§

1.

24. WiS. CONST. art. I, § 9.
25. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d at 472, 312 N.W.2d at 733 (quoting Adams v. Corriston, 7 Minn. 456 (1862) and citing State v. Graf, 72 Wis. 2d 179, 240 N.W.2d 387
(1976)).
26. Seinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d at 473, 312 N.W.2d at 734.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 474, 312 N.W.2d at 734.
29. Id. at 474-76, 312 N.W.2d at 735-36.
30. Id. at 476, 312 N.W.2d at 735.
31. Id. at 479-80, 312 N.W.2d at 736-37 (quoting Omernik v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 6,
218 N.W.2d 734 (1974) and citing State v. Graf, 72 Wis. 2d 179, 240 N.W.2d 387
(1976)).
32. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d at 479, 312 N.W.2d at 737 (quoting Sambs v. City of
Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 371, 293 N.W.2d 504, 512 (1980)). The rational relationship test is the less demanding of the two main tests recognized by the United-States
Supreme Court and Wisconsin courts. The more exacting test subjects a statutory
classification to "strict judicial scrutiny" and is used when a fundamental right or
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said the purpose of small claims court is to provide a speedy,

inexpensive method of handling minor claims.3 A costly,
time consuming jury trial thwarts this purpose.34 Therefore,
the court concluded, the jury fee requirement fairly allocates
the costs involved, discourages jury demands where last
minute settlements are anticipated, insures the sincerity of

the jury demand, and thus meets the legislative purpose of

promoting "summary" small claims proceedings.3 5 By contrast, the court noted, large claims procedures "are intended

to provide for a more complete resolution of complex
cases," 36 with the cost of resolving these disputes reflected in
a higher suit tax and clerk's fee.37 The court concluded that
the different treatment given litigants in the different courts
is in accord with the courts' different purposes and, therefore, does not deny equal protection. 8
Justice Abrahamson, writing for the dissent, persuasively

countered the majority's arguments, following essentially the

equal protection reasoning of the court of appeals.3 9 The
dissent said that the small claims jury fee does not bring the
expenses into proportion with the higher clerk's fee and suit

tax in a large claim action.40 Rather, the small claims jury
fee is in addition to extra charges which bring the suit tax
and clerk's fee up to the amount required in a large claims
suspect category is involved. Eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d
491, 506, 261 N.W.2d 434, 441 (1978). The majority said its finding that the fees did
not violate the right to trial by jury rendered the strict scrutiny test inapplicable.
Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d at 479 n.12, 312 N.W.2d at 737 n.12.
33. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d at 479-80 & n.13, 312 N.W.2d at 737 & n.13 (citing
Note, Uniform Small Claims Court Act, 1950 Wis. L. Rnv. 363, 365, 372).
34. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d at 481, 312 N.W.2d at 738.
35. Id. at 480-81, 312 N.W.2d at 737-38.
36. Id. at 482, 312 N.W.2d at 738.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 484, 312 N.W.2d at 739. The Steinpreis court did not address the general constitutional questions raised by requiring payment of court fees in advance of
trial. Analysis of such questions is beyond the scope of this note. For discussion of
the due process and equal protection issues raised when prepayment of court fees is
required, see, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971). For discussion of the right to equal litigation opportunity, see
generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1008-10 (1978).
39. See supra notes 11 & 21 and accompanying text.
40. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d at 489, 312 N.W.2d at 741 (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting).
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action.41 The dissent noted that prepayment of jury fees is
not needed, as the majority suggested, 42 to discourage jury
demands when settlement is anticipated. 43 Wisconsin statutes already give the court discretion in large and small
claims to assess one day's jury fee if a jury demand is made
and then withdrawn within two days of the trial date. 4 The
dissent also said jury fee prepayment is not needed to test a
litigant's sincerity since statutes already impose sanctions on
a party bringing a frivolous suit.45 Finally, the dissent rejected the argument that discouraging small claims jury requests to promote summary small claims trials is a legitimate
46
state objective justifying unequal treatment of litigants.
The dissent said the majority erred in thinking a summary small claims trial would be a "quick, informal, and
inexpensive proceeding."47 While the small claims procedure simplifies summons, service, pleadings and trial to a
court commissioner, 48 a small claims trial to the court or jury
is no more or less summary than a large claim trial to the
court or jury.49 This is so because a small claims jury request transforms the entire proceeding into a large claims
action.5 0 The small claim is then treated as if it had
originated as a large claim. The sole difference is that the
party requesting the jury must pay a jury fee. Had the claim
actually originated as a large claim, no jury fee would have
been imposed at all. Rather, the jury cost would have been
covered by the suit tax and clerk's fee.51 The dissent concluded that requiring small claims litigants to prepay jury
fees when large claims litigants are not so required violates
the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitu41. Id. See Wis. STAT. ch. 814 (1979) for court cost and fee allocation.
42. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d at 481, 312 N.W.2d at 738.
43. Id. at 485 n.2, 312 N.W.2d at 740 n.2.
44. Id. See also Wis. STAT. § 814.51 (1979).
45. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d at 494, 312 N.W.2d at 744. See also Wis.
§ 814.025 (1979).
46. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d at 491-97, 312 N.W.2d at 742-45.
47. Id. at 491, 312 N.W.2d at 742.
48. Id. at 493-94, 312 N.W.2d at 743-44.
49. Id. at 495, 312 N.W.2d at 744.
50. Id.
51. See Wis. STAT. ch. 814 (1979) for court cost and fee allocation.
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tions 5 2 Thus, the rational relationship test for disparate statutory classifications is not met. 3
II.

ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE

The essential difference between the majority and the
dissent in Steinpreis is that the majority decided that the
small claims prepayment statute passed the rational relationship test, while the dissent decided that it failed. Both the
majority 54 and the dissent55 recognized that analysis under
the test requires first determining the purpose of the challenged statute and then determining whether the statute's requirements bear a rational relationship to that purpose. To
understand further the impact of the court's ruling, it is helpful to consider the original purposes for creating small
claims courts, and to consider Wisconsin's practice in light
of this general background.
Small claims courts were established, at least in part, in
response to Dean Pound's 1913 HarvardLaw Review article 56 decrying the "cumbrous and expensive" 57 legal system
which denied the poor access to the courts. 5 8 The advent of
small
claims practice was heralded as "a method for improving the
quality of justice at the lowest level of the judicial
'
system. 59 Between 1920 and 1945, cities and states developed small claims courts billed as "forum[s] of common
sense" which aimed "to settle disputes quickly, understandably, and in a fair and just manner.

' 60

These courts were to

52. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d at 496-97, 312 N.W.2d at 745.
53. See supra notes 31 & 32 and accompanying text.
54. County of Portage v. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d 466, 479-80 & n.12, 312 N.W.2d
731, 736-37 & n.12 (1981) (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961)).
55. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d at 486-88, 312 N.W.2d at 740-41 (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 184
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
56. Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modem City, 26 HARV. L. REv.
302 (1913).
57. Id. at 315.
58. See, e.g., Allison, Problemsin the Delivery ofLegal Services, 63 A.B.A. J. 518,
518 (1977). That author noted that experiments with small claims courts began in the
United States after publication of Dean Pound's article. Id. See also Kosmin, The
Small Claims Court Dilemma, 13 Hous. L. Rnv. 934, 937 (1976).
59. Allison, supra note 58, at 518.
60. Kosmin, supra note 58, at 965.
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be the legal system for the poor.61
In recent years small claims courts have created more
problems for the poor than they have resolved. 62 The majority of poor persons involved with small claims courts are defendants. 3 Most of the plaintiffs are collection agencies, 64
small businesses- 5 and public utilities.66 Plaintiffs are often
represented by counsel; defendants are not.67 Defendants
may be given the option of requesting a jury trial, but may
also be required to pay in advance some form of security or
other court fee. 68 A recognized purpose of this requirement
is to discourage small claims jury trials. 9 Suggestions for
reform of these practices and problems' have dominated legal
commentaries on small claims.7 °
Cook County, Illinois, attacked the problem of its small
claims court by creating in 1972 a pro se branch of the court.
The new court's goal repeated the aims advocated by small
claims proponents of the first part of the century: the new
pro se branch would "offer a forum wherein individuals can
obtain a prompt and relatively inexpensive hearing and ad-

judication of their small claims." 7' The distinguishing char-

acteristics of the court are that a claim cannot exceed three
61. Eovaldi, The Pro Se Small Claims Court in Chicago: Justicefor the "Little
Guy"?, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 947, 948 n.6 (1978) (citing W. CHAMBLISS & R. SEIDMAN,
LAW, ORDER, AND POWER 104 (1971)).

62. For studies of small claims origins and problems, see Boden, Wisconsin Small
Claims Practice Under ck 299: A Discussion and Some Suggestions, 47 MARQ. L.
REv. 38 (1963); Eovaldi, The Pro Se Small Claims Court in Chicago: Justicefor the
"Little Guy", 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 947 (1978); King, Small ClaimsPracticein the United
States, 52 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 42 (1977); Kosmin, The Small Claims Court Dilemma,
13 Hous. L. REv. 934 (1976); Ward, Uniform Small Claims Court Act, 1950 Wis. L.
REv. 363. See also the sources, including studies on Wisconsin small claims practice,
cited by Justice Abrahamson in County of Portage v. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d 466, 492
n.5, 312 N.W.2d 731, 743 n.5 (1981) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
63. E.g., Eovaldi, supra note 61, at 948, 950; Kosmin, supra note 58, at 939-40,
942.
64. E.g., Eovaldi, supra note 61, at 948; King, supra note 62, at 44, 47; Kosmin,
supra note 58, at 939-40.
65. Id.
66. E.g., Kosmin, supra note 58, at 940.
67. Id. at 957; King, supra note 62, at 62 n.154.
68. E.g., Ward, supra note 62, at 367; Annot., 32 A.L.R. 865 (1923 & Supps. 19461976).
69. Ward, supra note 62, at 366; Boden, supra note 62, at 48.
70. See supra note 62.
71. Eovaldi, sufpra note 61, at 958.
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hundred dollars; a corporation, partnership or association
cannot be a plaintiff; a plaintiff cannot file more than three
actions per year; a plaintiff cannot be represented by an attorney;72 and jury trials are not permitted. 73 A study of the
court after two years of operation concluded that it had
overcome many of the problems of pro se litigation in small
claims court and had to a large extent achieved the original
purposes behind establishing such courts: redress of small
grievances at low cost to litigants. 74
Small claims in Wisconsin have been handled through a
variety of mechanisms from justices of the peace, to municipal courts, to a small claims branch of civil court.75
Throughout this judicial evolution, discouraging jury trials
was considered necessary to ensure small claims proceedings
that were "summary in nature. '76 Jury trials were available,
but the judge had discretion to require the party requesting
the jury to pay jury fees in advance of trial. 7 Even when an
action was begun before a justice of the peace, a party requesting a hearing in small claims court had to first pay seventy-five cents before the case would be transferred. 7 As
new and revised rules for small claims procedures were
drafted, legal scholars recognized that requiring advance
payment of fees might raise constitutional questions7 9 or, at
the very least, would unduly burden those litigants the procedures were designed to help.80 The court noted as early as
1868 that requiring advance payment of court costs as security would prevent poor persons from litigating."' But, the
court added, "if the suit of the plaintiff should prove ground72. For a discussion of the difficulties presented by attorney representation in
small claims court, see King, supra note 62, at 61, and Kosmin, supra note 58, at 956.
73. Filing an action in the pro se branch waives the right to representation by
counsel and the right to jury trial. Requesting a jury trial turns the case over to the
small claims court where an attorney may be retained. The waiver of constitutional
rights may withstand a constitutional challenge as long as an alternative forum is
available. Eovaldi, supra note 61, at 957.
74. Id. at 994-95.
75. Boden, supra note 62, at 39.
76. Ward, supra note 62, at 366.
77. Id. at 367.
78. Id.
79. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 302.04 advisory committee comment (West 1958).
80. Campbell v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 23 Wis. 490 (1868).
81. Id. at 491.
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less, unless security is given, the officers of the court could
get no pay for their services. ' 2 The court concluded that
83
any change in the rules should come from the legislature.
The small claims procedure currently in use has been
called a cross between an informal, administrative-type process and an essentially judicial procedure.8 4 With few exceptions, however, the process is far from being an easily
accessible judicial forum for litigants who cannot afford an
attorney.8 5 Several statutes require transferring the small
claims case to regular civil court when a litigant takes certain
designated actions.8 6 Other statutes grant the litigant rights
and provide technical procedures for exercising them, but
many litigants would neither be aware of nor understand
them without the assistance of an attorney. 7 The low rate of
jury demands could be a result of procedural ignorance on
the part of the litigants rather than a reluctance to pay jury
fees. Perhaps a more obvious reason for the few jury demands is that both plaintiffs and defendants are reluctant to
spend the time needed for a jury trial.8 8 These deterrents,
combined with the alternative methods available for discouraging frivolous claims, 9 render the jury fee requirement
a superfluous device for discouraging small claims jury
trials.
Returning to the "rational basis" analysis of legislative
categories, it is apparent that the purpose of the statute imposing jury fees is to discourage small claims jury trials. The
dissent in Steinpreis argued that this is not a legitimate state
objective 90 and concluded that the statute effecting the objec82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Boden, supra note 62, at 40.
See Wis. STAT. ch. 799 (1979) (procedure in small claims actions).
Wis. STAT. § 799.02 (1979) (filing counterclaims and cross complaints); Wis.
STAT. § 799.20(3) (1979) (motion to implead a third party).
87. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 799.205 (1979) (substitution of judge); Wis. STAT.
§ 799.21(3) (1979) (trial by jury); Wis. STAT. § 799.28 (1979) (motions for new trial).
88. In early small claims practice in Hartford, Connecticut, a party could request
a transfer from small claims court to the regular civil docket without incurring any
fees whatsoever. During an 18-month study period, fewer than one percent of all
small claims filed were transferred. Ward, supra note 62, at 369.
89. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
90. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d at 496-97, 312 N.W.2d at 745 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (quoting LaBowe v. Balthazar, 180 Wis. 419, 423, 193 N.W. 244, 246 (1923)).
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tive was unconstitutional.9 ' Even if it is assumed that discouraging jury trials is a legitimate objective given the desire
for speed in small claims adjudication, 92 it is not apparent
that placing a higher cost on small claims litigants than on
large claims litigants is a rational way to achieve that purpose. Why should a party in a small claims action pay the
same clerk's fee and suit tax as a party in a regular civil action, and also pay a jury fee? The majority opinion in Steinpreis fails to answer that question satisfactorily. In fact,
since the jury trial of a claim commenced in small claims
court does not necessarily cost the state more than one begun
in regular civil court, there is no rational basis for treating
the different classes of litigants differently; 93the result is an
unconstitutional denial of equal protection.
III.

CONCLUSION

Although the supreme court's decision in Steinpreis lets
stand the unequal treatment of small claims and large claims
litigants, the four to three decision is not an overwhelming
display of enthusiasm for the rule. The decision should
serve as a starting point for legislative reconsideration of
Wisconsin small claims practice. If the state is serious about
promoting a speedy, informal and inexpensive small claims
system, then it should replace the current morass of small
claims rules and consider a strictly pro se or administrative
process. It should adopt procedures that create a small
claims "forum of common sense." At the very least, the legislature should eliminate the requirement that small claims
litigants prepay jury fees.
NANCY

L.

VAN SWOL

91. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d at 497, 312 N.W.2d at 745 (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting).
92. Speedy resolution of disputes is also a goal in regular civil court cases. Wis.
STAT. § 801.01(1) (1979). Section 801.01(1) provides that the civil procedure statutes
"shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding." Id.
93. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d at 489-90, 312 N.W.2d at 741-42 (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting) (quoting County of Portage v. Steinpreis, Nos. 80-037, 80-038, slip op. at 5
(Wis. Ct. App. July 28, 1980) (available on LEXIS, Wis library, Ct App ifie)).

